Analysis of media narratives on the Sino-India conflict in Global Times

Mukesh Devrari, Harsh Dobhal, Devam Thapa

This exploratory study attempts to analyse the Sino-India hostilities in the backdrop of the military clashes at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Union Territory of Ladakh in 2020. It identifies four patterns in the Chinese narrative about the border confrontations in the coverage of Global Times. First, it stakes a claim on the territories controlled by India in the Western and Eastern sector boundaries. Secondly, it contends that any attempts to stop Chinese nibbling at the LAC will lead to military confrontation. Thirdly, it argues that China is determined to take control of the territory it lays claim on, and geopolitical concerns are not shaping its policies towards India. Fourth, it also argues that Beijing can continue to access India’s vast market despite border clashes as Indian consumers benefit from cheap imports from China.  

Keywords: Media analysis, Sino-India clashes, Chinese Media, Line of Actual Control, territorial conflict, Global Times 

Background

India and China share a long border across the western, middle and eastern sectors. The boundary at the western sector is controversial due to two differing perceptions. India considers Johnson Line as a legitimate boundary, whereas China considers McDonald Line. As per the former, Aksai Chin falls under Union Territory of Ladakh, and as per the latter, it falls under Xinxiang province. China built a national highway passing through this region in the 1950s. India could know about this highway only after the news of its inauguration was published in the Chinese press.⁽¹⁾

The borderlines along the eastern sector are also highly contested. During the 1962 war, China could easily cut off all the Indian north-eastern states from the rest of the country. Still, it declared a unilateral ceasefire as India could not even put up a big fight in Arunachal Pradesh. India was caught unprepared to face the Chinese onslaught on the border. In desperation, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the United States President John F. Kennedy for help, and before the support could materialise, the war had ended.⁽²⁾

The 1962 experience had a devastating effect and dented Nehru’s stature as a statesman along with his cherished idealism. China seized the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh in the 1962 war. However, the Chinese handed Arunachal Pradesh back and retreated behind the McMahon Line, which they continued to describe as illegal⁽³⁾ till this day.

Sino-Indian conflict is relatively new, given historical and cultural ties between the two neighbours. Except for the boundary issue, both countries share a long history of prolonged peace and cultural exchanges.

In fact, Buddhism travelled from India to China in 67 AD along the Silk Road. In those days, the relationship between China and India was one of mutual respect and admiration. The monk Fa-hsien (337 to 422 AD), who travelled from China to India to study Buddhism, referred to the latter as Madhyadesa (Sanskrit for “Middle Kingdom”), which is similar in meaning to Zhongguo, the word the Chinese used to describe China. In the 1930s, no less a scholar than Beijing University’s Hu Shih said that the sixth-century AD marked the “Indianisation of China.”⁽⁴⁾

The trouble in the bilateral relations began soon after the CCP annexed Tibet and rejected Indo-Tibet borders that India inherited from its British rulers; the CCP started laying claims on bordering areas that were part of British India. As a result, the Sino-Indian relationship turned hostile. This unresolved boundary conflict is also a reason for their geopolitical rhetoric and strategic suspicion of each other.⁽⁵⁾

The CCP strategists have decided to ignore, partly owing to their ideological animosity towards India, that if the boundary question could not be resolved promptly, then hostilities and antagonism would eventually percolate down among the masses. And it might also adversely impact people to people relations as well. China has been increasingly perceived as an enemy after the gruesome killings of 20 Indian soldiers by Chinese forces in June 2020 at Galwan Valley using “a medieval mix of stones, clubs, and nail-studded rods”.⁽⁶⁾ India’s national media intensely discussed the violent clashes. At the same time, China did not allow freewheeling discussion on boundary conflict due to its authoritarian political structure and absolute control of domestic communications systems.⁽⁷⁾ Eight months after the clashes, China accepted the loss of four of its soldiers⁽⁸⁾.

Boundary disputes make Sino-India relations highly volatile leading to a looming threat over the region of a military conflict. China insists on managing the boundary dispute rather than resolving it while keeping India under constant military pressure. India’s ability to deal with an aggressive and expansionist China having far bigger military and economic prowess is limited. Strategically, India needs allies to deal with the threat posed by China. India's only option to deal with China’s threat is to partner with the United States and use multilateral mechanisms to stand against rising China in Asia.⁽⁹⁾  

The intrusions by Chinese forces at various points at LAC in the Union Territory of Ladakh started in May 2020.⁽¹⁰⁾ The media in India intensely discussed the reasons for CCP’s increasing belligerence. They broadly attributed the Chinese behaviour to its expansionist tendencies owing to a manifold increase in China’s economic and military might. As a result, CCP is gradually pushing territorial claims further towards India.

China’s widely followed English language newspaper Global Times, published by People’s Daily, while covering and discussing the clashes with India in the Ladakh region, primarily focussed on propagating the Chinese nationalist perspective on the conflict. It generally gives voice to the opinion of party members on international issues, which could not be expressed through the official channels due to their radical and confrontationist character.⁽¹¹⁾ The United States also declared it a foreign mission to reveal its real status as a propaganda outlet under the control of the Chinese Communist Party.⁽¹²⁾

This study attempts to analyse the dominant narratives in Global Times on Sino-India border clashes from 01 June 2020 to 31 October 2020. The articles discussing various aspects of Sino-India relations have been selected by using the search box inside the website of Global Times. Fifty articles, including news, editorials and opinion pieces, have been chosen through purposive sampling. It is important to note that this study does not deal with the details of China’s intrusion in the Union Territory of Ladakh. Instead, it is an attempt to critically discuss and contextualise the broader narratives about the clashes in Global Times.

Literature review

China is a party state. The CCP controls its authoritarian political system. Chinese media have been widely perceived as instruments of government propaganda, tightly controlled by the party and lacking any independence.⁽¹³⁾ The media in China works as an extended organ of the party-state and remains strictly under the official control of the ruling regime.^{(14, 15)} “Effective use of the media as a political tool is always a top CCP priority”.⁽¹⁶⁾ CCP uses media propaganda⁽¹⁷⁾ to outline its hyper-nationalist position on all bilateral disputes with other nations.

Information about China’s perception of India is so far limited.⁽¹⁸⁾ Although in one of the recent studies, Singh⁽¹⁹⁾ (2020) explains unique narratives which emerge in Chinese language media about the recent clashes and broadly divides Chinese strategists into three groups. The first group wants an immediate solution to the boundary dispute by capturing territories China returned to India after seizing them in the 1962 war. This group regrets China’s decision to return Arunachal Pradesh to India. It is demanding swift military action against India to resolve the boundary dispute. The second group considers India should be choked from all sides by China, particularly in the Indian ocean. And when the time is right, China must compel India to hand over the territories in Ladakh and Arunachal. A third group sees no point in over militarisation of the land border with India as it will lead to India openly posing difficulties for China by aligning itself with the United States, which is more than willing to capitalise on the conflict.

The Chinese scholars claim that “China is a success and India is a failure, that India's democracy leads to its poverty and religious intolerance, and China's economic reform without political opening was the only correct path to development and stability”.⁽²⁰⁾ On the other hand, others argue that China does not perceive India as a serious threat due to the rising gap between economic and military strength of two countries,⁽²¹⁾ it merely describes India as the United States pawn in the larger geopolitical tussle between two superpowers. The different aspects of the Sino-India conflict have been discussed and analysed in detail by several scholars, but there are not many studies looking at the media narratives built around the bilateral conflict. It is in this context that the current study is looking at the portrayal of the conflict by Global Times.

China never diluted its stringent position on boundary disputes while Indian leaders gave inordinate concessions to China on all fronts.⁽²²⁾ It continues to claim territories controlled by India. After every incursion by China, scholars in India critically look for the reasons for China’s aggressive behaviour. Even after the 1962 war, the same questions were asked, which are being asked after the recent clashes in Ladakh in 2020. Appadorai (1963) tried to answer the possible reasons for the Chinese invasion in 1962 in his essay titled ‘Chinese aggression and India: An introductory essay’, which is still relevant to understand the intricacies of the complex issue. His analysis clearly explains that China had clarity on the boundary issue, and the CCP policies towards India were consistent and unravelled in stages. First, after coming to power in 1949, CCP consolidated its control over Tibet and sought India’s cooperation. Second, It misled Prime Minister Nehru in 1954 by not openly laying claims on Indian territories. Once the complete military control over Tibet was established, China informed India that the McMahon line would have to be renegotiated, terming the boundary between India and Tibet established by Britishers as unjustified. It argued that any government which considers imperialism as evil must not insist on benefitting from the fruits of British colonialism.⁽²³⁾

Analysis

The articles published in Global Times about Sino-India clashes at LAC in Ladakh are reflective of the CCP’s hawkish position. The dominant narrative in the newspaper had four elements dealing with territorial claims, military conflict, geopolitics and bilateral trading relations. The Global Times held India entirely responsible for the clashes at the LAC and described the region as Chinese territory. It repeatedly threatened India with dire consequences and highlighted China’s far more superior military and naval strength. It also claimed that Chinese actions on the territory are guided by its historic position rather than any recent geopolitical reasons. It also tried to delink the bilateral trading relations and military clashes.

The unmarked LAC is the most dangerous aspect of Sino-India relations, which could potentially ignite a full-scale war.⁽²⁴⁾ The large sections of LAC are patrolled by both the countries as CCP refuses to recognise the borders India inherited from its British rulers, neither is it willing to convert the existing positions as international border while keeping what it has already seized from India in 1962 war and continuous nibbling at the territory over the years. China claims that India’s insistence on converting LAC into an international border is unacceptable, and the boundary should be fixed through negotiations.⁽²⁵⁾ So, the options available to India to deal with CCP’s aggression at the borders are extremely limited.

As per various news reports, India had lost 1000 sq km of territory to China recently^{(26, 27)} due to the continuous Chinese nibbling at LAC. Although India never publicly accepted the scale of China’s transgression, neither did China give any information about the territory it seized from India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi also claimed that no one intruded inside India’s territory⁽²⁸⁾, but opposition parties questioned the government’s position.⁽²⁹⁾

While not divulging any information about the military skirmishes and intrusion on the border, the CCP tactically did not react to the Indian government’s dissemination of contradictory information about the situation on the ground. Global Times, though, constantly assumed threatening overtones towards India by stating that military options are open to resolve the boundary dispute.

According to Global Times, the latest rift on the LAC is also due to the construction of roads in border areas and “India's construction of infrastructure on Chinese territory must be stopped”.⁽³⁰⁾ The construction of the 255-km long Daulat Beg Oldie all-weather road by India enraged China.⁽³¹⁾ Though China has created world-class infrastructure on its side of the LAC,⁽³²⁾ it does not want India to build similar infrastructure.

As China’s economic and strategic power has substantially increased due to its economic transformation, it is aggressively laying claims on territories held by India,⁽³³⁾ openly threatening that “if India makes more hostile moves, China could respond with countermeasures - and India will not be able to count on the US for help”.⁽³⁴⁾

In view of the Chinese posturing, Indian policymakers should openly discuss, question and address the following issues. First, is it wise to ignore China’s postures as empty threats? Second, how much territory controlled by India is claimed by China? Third, how much territory China has already wrested from India during the CCP rule since 1949? Fourth, why can the LAC not be demarcated and converted into the international border with minor exchanges of territory here and there? Fifth, why can the Indian government not heavily invest in matching China’s efforts in developing border infrastructure? Sixth, what are the apprehensions of India for avoiding international scrutiny of Chinese actions? And lastly, if India is willing to convert existing boundaries into international borders, what measure should it employ to achieve this? 

The attempts by China to downplay the border clashes suggest that China does not want any international coverage of the conflict with India, possibly because of two reasons. First, due to China’s authoritarian system, western nations are unlikely to trust Chinese narratives as attempts by CCP to hide the emergence of coronavirus in Wuhan damaged China’s global standing. And its assault on Hong Kong invited further international condemnation. That’s why the CCP has mysteriously resorted to censoring the ‘China-India border confrontation’ hashtag on Weibo, which had garnered 30 million hits.⁽³⁵⁾ Secondly, China is a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); if it uses force to solve disputes with relatively weaker neighbours, then it will further lose credibility and encourage all its adversaries to come together against it under US leadership.    

The Global Times published a survey claiming that 89.1 per cent of participants support military retaliation against India at the LAC while claiming that that Indian troops attacked Chinese soldiers again on 15 June 2020 but paid a heavy price and suffered serious causalities (20 deaths, 76 injured and 10 captured as reported by media).⁽³⁶⁾ This portrayal referred to the assault on Indian soldiers with medieval weapons by Chinese forces.

China believes that in any military clash, it will emerge victorious, as it did in the 1962 war.⁽³⁷⁾ India lost 37,000 sq km of territory in the conflict. Pakistan also handed over another 5,180 sq km of northern Kashmir in the 1963 pact to China. After the 1962 war, LAC emerged as a de-facto border but with a common area patrolled by the security forces from both sides. Although China never allowed India to put markings on the LAC. China wants LAC to remain undefined so that it could occupy the territory with brute military force and change the status quo and pass it as fait accompli. Due to this reason, China is not interested in resolving and identifying the LAC.⁽³⁸⁾

Chinese scholars still claim that the Indian government was blinded by selfish interests and wanted to force the Chinese to accept an illegal borderline created by British India. This was boldly rejected in 1962.⁽³⁹⁾ While India and China share a long border without a major military presence in an eyeball-to-eyeball situation, over the years, China has created infrastructure on its side of LAC by investing billions of dollars which will help China to mobilise its forces during the potential military clash.⁽⁴⁰⁾  

To match the scale and speed of the infrastructure developed by China on its side of the LAC is beyond India’s capabilities as the country is facing economic distress, COVID-19 pandemic and communal tensions due to the divisive policies of the ruling nationalist government, which has sharpened India’s internal fault lines.⁽⁴¹⁾ China is in a much stronger economic position compared to India for any confrontation, so they are strengthening their positions along the boundary.⁽⁴²⁾

The CCP’s approach towards the boundary question has not changed since the inception of the party-state, and it still applies the same principles and logic it used during the 1962 conflict.⁽⁴³⁾ Global Times also rejects all suggestions claiming China’s increasing belligerence is a result of geopolitical manoeuvring by India to establish closer links with the United States to contain China. It insists that India is increasingly becoming hostile to China due to rising United States influence, but it emphasises that all Chinese actions at the LAC are guided by China’s effort to protect its territorial interests. It also repeatedly questioned the role of the United States in instigating India and other countries to confront China.   

In earlier phases of its development since its opening up in 1978, China became an ally of the United States.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Now, it is becoming an adversary due to the rising global ambitions of the CCP under Xi Jinping, who also appointed himself President for life.⁽⁴⁵⁾ It has ruffled quite a few feathers in the United States, and now there is partisan support for a tougher line on CCP.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, outlined the US administration’s new approach by pitching rivalry with China in ideological terms.  

The only way to truly change communist China is to act not on the basis of what Chinese leaders say, but how they behave. When it comes to the CCP, I say we must distrust and verify. The truth is that our policies – and those of other free nations – resurrected China’s failing economy, only to see Beijing bite the international hands that were feeding it. General Secretary Xi is not destined to tyrannise inside and outside of China forever, unless we allow it. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

White House also published a report titled United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China (2020) outlining the changed approach to deal with China’s attempt to challenge the United States and its role in maintaining global order. The report highlights a commitment to counter China’s challenge to United States security, values and global economic leadership and compel Beijing to cease or reduce actions harmful to the United States’ vital national interests and those of her allies and partners.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The United States still has considerable influence to ensure that it is not displaced as the world’s most prominent economic and military power soon. It has deep political, cultural and military linkages with the other western countries. On the other hand, China has disputes with many Asian countries, including India and Japan. It also has a troubled relationship with many countries in the South China Sea region. The new developments in Sino-US relations are likely to encourage countries threatened by China’s rising military prowess to coordinate with the United States to confront belligerent CCP. 

As India is not a match to China in terms of its economic and military capacities, it needs global partnerships to balance rising China. However, all its efforts to remain subtle, not offend China by appearing to get closer to powers trying to check China did not deliver any results so far. China views India with deep scepticism and believes that India is afraid of China, so it tries to masquerade its efforts.⁽⁹⁾

While the Indian government indulges in appeasement of China,⁽⁴⁹⁾ Beijing disregards India’s core concerns by fully supporting Pakistan’s claims on Jammu & Kashmir. China has constantly worked with Pakistan at the United Nations and vetoed all proposals to ban Islamic terrorist groups and their leaders. Chinese leadership particularly protected the Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar from UN sanctions for a long time.⁽⁵⁰⁾

“Chinese pugnacity toward India along the LAC represents deliberate intimidation through the use of military force”.⁽⁵¹⁾ The current round of skirmishes is more dangerous as China is now seeking the territories it earlier did not lay a claim on.⁽⁵²⁾ Its attempts to change the status quo unilaterally by using military force have sent shock waves in India.

The Global Times also argued that India and China are likely to have normal trading relations despite violent military clashes at LAC. It claimed that India’s economic growth and progress is dependent on cheap imports and investment from China. It described rising nationalism and protectionist policies as the reasons for banning Chinese information technology companies by India rather than the border clashes which has been used as a pretext.   

Over the last few years, Chinese companies have been immensely successful in India. Many have captured a considerable market share, but it did not change the CCP’s belligerence towards India at LAC. While showing utter disregard for India’s sensitivities and national interests, CCP still wants unbridled access to India’s vast market. It will not be possible for the ruling regime in India to separate economic and strategic policies towards China.⁽⁵³⁾  

Although the Chinese companies that have already invested in India’s manufacturing sector are likely to function freely, unrestricted access to China to increase its footprint in India is unlikely to happen after the CCP decided to corner India militarily. Due to the CCP’s aggressive policies, the spontaneous citizen-led boycott China movement has emerged in India.⁽⁵⁴⁾

China attained a remarkable economic transformation in the last few decades. Now it envisages itself as the centre of global economic activities and trade. It introduced Belt and Road Initiative to attain its objectives.⁽⁵⁵⁾ At the same time, CCP also heavily invested in spreading China’s political and social influence in other countries to challenge the western social, cultural and political model.⁽⁵⁶⁾

The CCP strategists believe that India has remained far behind. Now it has no choice but to accept China’s hegemony and surrender to its demands as China’s economy is five times bigger than India.⁽⁵⁷⁾ It also has a strong trading relationship with all major industrialised nations, whereas India is still struggling to achieve a similar economic transformation.

While commenting on the CCP’s approach towards India, Deepak⁽⁵²⁾argues that resolving boundary disputes is not a priority for China. Instead, its emphasis is to ensure peace and stability in the region necessary for its progress. He further claims that China can seize the disputed territory from India through military action as it has created superior infrastructure on its side of the LAC, and India has not done enough to catch up with it. 

Discussion

The media narrative on issues in China cannot be dismissed as inconsequential bluster. “Chinese media helps shape the agenda for foreign policymakers, narrow down the set of policy options, change the pace of policymaking and implementation, and influence the direction of the final decision”.⁽⁵⁸⁾ In Global Times the state-led nationalism remains a central narrative.⁽⁵⁹⁾ It holds a contemptuous view of other nations and outrightly rejects the complaints against China’s rising belligerence while overestimating the importance of China. It displays remarkable self-assurance in describing objections raised by other nations against China’s aggressive policies as hysteria. It mainly focuses on comparing China with the United States.  

India does not pose any challenge to the United States-led global order, while China is perceived as a direct threat to its influence and interests globally. Therefore, United States is mobilising support from “open societies and democracies” to contain CCP’s expansionist designs ⁽⁶⁰⁾ and India could very well be a beneficiary of this situation if drawn into the United States led formal or informal alliance, which might not help India directly at the LAC in the short run but can be critical in the long term to confront aggressive China.

Despite having modern aspirations and appearing to keep pace with the rapidly changing world, China is subscribing to notions of territorial expansion, international hegemony, and inherent superiority.⁽⁶¹⁾ It is in this context, and not without reason, that the CCP decided to flare up the border tensions with India. “The Chinese state does not take such steps in a fit of absent-mindedness or as a knee-jerk reaction to some provocation. This must fit into a long-term design”.⁽⁶²⁾

India needs a robust strategic regime to deal with rising China, which is attempting to replace the influence of the United States in Asia, which India considers against its long-term interests.⁽⁶³⁾ Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed willingness to establish a cordial and mutually viable relationship with China, but despite his efforts, China did not respond positively to his appeasement. In the last six years, both countries have had many border clashes, each resulting in China substantiating its territorial claims. A policy of appeasement also failed in the past. The New York Times wrote after PLA killed Indian soldiers at the border in 1959 that Chinese communists have repeatedly brushed aside Indian protests in an attitude little short of contemptuous. It further added a policy of restraint by Nehru is praiseworthy in principle but appears to be aggravating the situation rather than easing tensions. It questioned how China could gain anything by repeatedly antagonising an influential neighbour that has been a respectable apologist for Communist China.⁽⁶⁴⁾

Now the strategists are questioning Prime Minister Modi’s approach towards handling international affairs. “With his excessive personalisation of policy and stubborn strategic naivete, he has shown himself not as the diplomatically deft strongman he purports to be”.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Though there is the larger belief that India is willing to convert LAC into an international border,⁽⁶⁵⁾ but China rejects any such possibilities and insists on changing the ground realities.

China’s claim over the territory controlled by India is not only confrontational but untenable. Boundaries of the modern nation-state have changed over the centuries due to many reasons. It is pointless whether a geographical area was in India or China a century ago or beyond. That cannot be a determining factor to redraw the boundaries as CCP is insisting. It is unfair for any nation to seek territories based on its historical perceptions as it will lead to bloodshed, war and mutual destruction.

The belligerence of CCP has already derailed the peaceful bilateral Sino-India relationship. It consistently employs deception, concealment and surprise in peacetime.⁽⁴⁹⁾ At the beginning of the 21^st century, the two sides had agreed not to let the border dispute affect bilateral engagements ⁽⁶⁶⁾ though it is likely to change due to rising hostilities over the boundary. As CCP works behind closed doors, it is impossible to figure out the exact reasons for recent aggression, but these developments point towards the shape of the global order in the coming decades.

The rise of China has threatened the regional peace and the rule-based world order the United States has championed after the Second World War.⁽⁶⁷⁾ “The size and rapid growth of China, together with its increasing assertiveness, represent a challenge to the established global order”.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Due to the Xi regimes aggressive policies, the United States, Japan, Australia and India are likely to strengthen their alliance to ensure stability and peace in the Asia Pacific region.⁽⁶⁹⁾

“The current Sino-Indian border crisis has revealed that China has little respect for India’s long-standing efforts to freeze the status quo along the two countries’ disputed frontiers or for New Delhi’s cautious efforts to avoid the appearance of balancing against Beijing”.⁽⁵¹⁾ India and China boundary dispute is a straightforward affair. India is fighting to keep the territory under its control which it inherited from the British government or whatever is left of it after the Indo-China war in 1962 and subsequent Chinese nibbling. Similarly, China normalises its military transgressions by citing differences in the perceptions over the LAC and blames India for border clashes.

Conclusion

The Global Times expressed China’s ultra-nationalist perspective on Sino-India conflicts. It fully supported China’s brazen attempts to change the status quo at LAC through military force and severely downplayed the brutal killing of 20 Indian soldiers by the People’s Liberation Army. It openly issued threats and warnings that India should be mindful of the consequences of confronting China at LAC as PLA might resort to full-scale military retaliation to push back Indian soldiers present in the region. It claimed that PLA is better prepared for military conflict, citing India’s over-reliance on imported weapons to maintain military strength.

It portrayed a skewed picture of only India being affected by military confrontations while arguing that as the world’s second-largest economy, China can easily overwhelm India’s attempt to confront it. There was a palpable sense of military, economic and geopolitical superiority in the Global Times narrative. At the same time, India is dismissed as a struggling economy used by the United States as a pawn against China.

Global Times repeatedly proclaimed that China would not compromise on its territorial integrity. It argued that India seeks concessions and compromises on the territorial dispute by entering into alliances with the United States and its global allies. It also suggested that India’s all efforts would go in vain and China would never give any concessions on boundary dispute to India. 

The propaganda in the Global Times was also evident as it ignored the setbacks China faced and described the global retaliation as an opportunity for China’s companies to adapt themselves to the emerging challenges. Although its hawkish approach is not unique towards India, it disparaged Japan, Australia and all other countries that attempted to confront China on a range of issues involving the territorial waters, demanding an inquiry into the origins of coronavirus in Wuhan and so on.

Global Times particularly disparaged India and the United States for their inability to control the corona pandemic and highly exalted China’s stupendous success in controlling the pandemic, which also, according to the daily, reflects on the effective Chinese political system and CCP leadership. The newspaper also twisted facts, spread lies, magnified half-truths, exaggerated China’s achievements and limitations of its rivals & pushed hyper-nationalism.

Global Times also peddled the view that clashes would not affect the normal bilateral trading relations as any attempts to reduce the imports from China will only harm the consumer interests in India and further stymie economic growth. It also insisted that the ban on Chinese apps were the result of rising nationalism and had no link with the killing of Indian soldiers in Ladakh. The paper attempted to delink the trading relations with boundary conflict.   

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(Mukesh Devrari is a New Zealand based media researcher. Harsh Dobhal is Visiting Professor at School of Media and Communication Studies, Doon University, Dehradun. Devam Thapa is Ph D Scholar at Centre for Media Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)